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BOOK REVIEWS
By Gideon Hausner. New York: Harper & Row. 1966.
Pp. xii, 528. $12.50.

JUSTICE IN JERUSALEM.

The world is in debt, and will remain so for all time, to Gideon Hausner,
author of Justice in Jerusalem, the most important book, so far as I am concerned, since Les Miserables by the immortal Victor Hugo. Gideon Hausner
is a lawyer and his book deals with a courtroom trial, but it is more than the
story of forensic conflict. It is a dramatic, heart-searing account of the most
vast crime in history- the cold-blood murder of 6,000,000 unarmed, innocent,
helpless men, women, and children. How could such an earth-shaking event
occur in the twentieth century? What had happened to our civilization? Where
were the guardians of the law, the protectors of human life, the guardsmen of
human dignity? Unless someone answers these questions, unless there is a key
to this mystery of the tramping of the grapes of life into the poison of hatred,
persecution, and slaughter, the vaunted progress of man through the centuries
is a myth, as well as a snare and a delusion.
Mr. Hausner answers the questions I have put, and in doing so, frightens,
enlightens, enthrals, and at last, offers comfort that the brotherhood of man
does not need to be a mere figure of speech, an empty dream, an academic
Utopia, but can attain reality, provided the lessons of the Eichmann trial are
taken to heart by mankind.
This is to be a review of Justice in Jerusalem, but it is not a conventional
review because Mr. Hausner's book is not conventional and will find no conventional shelf in the library of the human spirit. Another reason this review
is not conventional is that the reviewer is somewhat involved in the story the
book unfolds. I was a witness at the Eichmann trial. I speak, therefore, with
some personal knowledge of my own, and I speak with some feeling, because
I believe that the people of the world, and particularly those of the Western
nations, are in a degree responsible for the holocaust which could have been
averted had Hitler been curbed, as it was our duty to curb him in 1936, when
he made known his plans to plunge the world into an ocean of blood.
Begin with the picture of a Nazi official loading a thousand small children
onto a ship. He then boards a gunboat and tows the ship out to sea, fires a
cannon into its hull, and watches it slowly sink as the tots scream for rescue, their
hands outstretched for help, and their voices, one by one, being smothered by
the engulfing waters, until at last all one can see, after the foam and bubbles
of the plunging ship have disappeared, are a few girls' bonnets and boys' caps
floating about as if looking for the fair heads they had once covered with all
the hopes and promises of girlhood and boyhood.
Let us now consider that the person who performed the loading, accomplished the towing, fired the cannon, and watched the infants tumbling into
their watery graves has been taken into custody and is brought to trial for what
he has done. How would the prosecutor of that murderer of a thousand children comport himself in the courtroom, especially if he were a man of deep
580
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feeling? How could he keep his passions under control; how could he prevent
his reprobation for so unspeakably cruel a deed from exploding into incoherent
vituperation, especially if the prosecutor were of the same ethnic and religious
families as the children who had been murdered for those reasons alone?
These are the queries which entered my consciousness in the spring of
1961 as I read of the preparations being made in Jerusalem for the trial of
Adolf Eichmann, the loader, tow-er, and the destroyer of the infant-laden craft.
The ouly difference between the hypothetical maritime episode I have described
and the actual Nazi malefaction is the difference between 1,000 and 1,000,000,
for at least one sixth of the 6,000,000 who perished in the holocaust, which
was planned, supervised, and, to a great extent, executed by Eichmann, had
not reached adulthood. The only difference between the sinking of a vessel
with little boys and girls running with agonizing helplessness to the smashed
lifeboats and the actual mass infanticide perpetrated by the Nazis was that the
mass drowning was an act of tender sympathy in comparison to the methods
actually employed by Eichmann in sending to their unmarked graves 1,000,000
of God's children. Slow starvation; flogging; exposure to ice, snow, and freezing temperature; shooting after long marches to the firing grounds; strangulation; gassing and hanging- these were only some of the methods of killing
directed by Adolf Eichmann.
What kind of a man would be, or should be, the prosecutor of such a
brain-staggering crime? In order to achieve an intellectual result commensurate
with the moral vindication of murder 6,000,000 times repeated, he would have
to be almost a superman; he would have to be a giant of intellect, a lion of
courage, and a dynamo of never-ceasing energy. He would have to have a
mind capable of grasping 100,000 details derived from human testimony and
countless documents; and because Eichmann's crimes were committed in 18 different countries over a period of at least a decade, he would have to be the
master of continental geography and encyclopedic history. This mountain of
evidence would have to be analyzed, classified, co-ordinated, and tagged, and
not for the leisurely study of historians writing years after the events; this classification had to be pigeonholed in the brain of the prosecutor for instantaneous
recall in the courtroom at a trial that could be compared to battling with a tiger,
for Adolf Eichmann was shrewd, resourceful, and capable of inventing and
fabricating on the spot as easily as a panthei leaps from a mountain crag at the
f
throat of his prey.
Justice in Jeruslem describes how this mastery was accomplished, how the
multitudinous details were stored in Hausner's brain cells, while his heart wept
for his martyred countrymen, among whom were several of his own kinsmen.
But tears must not dim the vision of scientific prosecution, and they did not,
as we now know from the transcript of the Eichmann trial.
It is our good fortune that, like Winston Churchill, Mr. Hausner is as
capable a writer as he is a doer. His written words illumine the landscape of
narrative as lightning lifts mountains and valleys into dramatic relief. And so,
we live through every feature of the monumental preparation for the Eichmann
trial, the fiercely contested trial itself, and then, the sentencing and aftermath.
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We see and feel the stupendous problems which confronted the Israeli tribunal
at the very outset of the Eichmann affair.
Much of the intelligentsia of the world found serious fault with Israel's
assumption of jurisdiction over Eichmann; the periodicals of the day ran with
torrents of fiery castigation of the young nation. Oscar Handlin, Professor of
History at Harvard University, set the tone for the bitter invective to be hurled
against Israel, when he said:
The way in which the Eichmann affair has unfolded provides substantial grounds for the fear that justice will be the least of the ends at which the
trial will aim. The mode of the Nazi's capture, the claims of wide Israeli
jurisdiction and the violence to well-established principles indicate that
other than juridical considerations will be preeminent in the Jerusalem
Whatever the crimes of which Eichmann may be guilty,
courtroom ....
they were not committed within territory over which that government
was sovereign at the time; indeed that state was not yet in existence
when the crimes were alleged to have occurred.'
This bombastic fusillade was typical of the fire emerging from the muskets
of other college professors, newspaper editors, and TV-Radio conmentators
who could not see the primeval rotten forest of uncontained vileness for the
gnarled trees of stiff-necked sticklerism. They could not see, or did not want
to see, that here was a crime of unprecedented monstrousness, and that if it
went unredressed it would be an invitation to other international butchers to
repeat the crime; for no one can truly believe that the cleaver of racial, religious,
political, and ethnic persecution has been put permanently away.
It was Hausner's responsibility to reply to all the critics, for although he
spoke in the Beit Ha'am, he was really speaking to the world, whose eyes were
focused on Jerusalem. Hundreds of newspaper reporters and magazine writers
attended the trial. Every word spoken in the courtroom and every gesture made
was recorded permanently by video tape and motion picture film. On the floori
Dr. Robert Servatius, attorney for Eichmann, spoke for the global detractors,
echoing their animadversions and damning appraisal of Israel.
Hausner's reply was electrifyingly brilliant and hit the target on every critical
front. He examined and discussed all the authorities presented by the defense;
he cited cases, textbook writers, and international law treatises; he analyzed
decisions, taking up both the majority and minority opinions. Roman law,
English law, American law, French law, and the law of all other leading nations
came under his keenly penetrating review; and when he had finished, not a
pebble of authority was left that supported the extravaganzas of Oscar Handlin
and the even more extravagant charges projected by Dr. Servatius.
In answer to the proposition that Eichmann's crimes were not committed
the world jury on Israel's soil, Mr. Hausner reminded the tribunal -and
that the State of Israel succeeded, as a nation, to Palestine, and whatever injury was inflicted on the Jewish community was a wound that lacerated Palestine as well. To say that Eichmarm was not amenable to Israeli law because
Israel was not yet a state in 1939-1945 would be to argue that a man who
1 American Council for Judaism, Winter Issue 1961, pp. 1-2.
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committed murder in the colony of Pennsylvania on July 3, 1776, could not
be prosecuted by the State of Pennsylvania on July 5, 1776. Obviously, a new
state inherits the sovereign power and responsibilities of the state it succeeds.
In answer to the charge of "kidnapping" levelled at Israel for taking
Eichmann out of Argentina and transporting him to Israel, Hausner quoted
United States Supreme Court decisions, as well as decisions from England and
other countries, which have held that the manner in which a person is brought
to trial in a court having jurisdiction over the offense can in no way affect the
legality of the trial. In this respect it might be well to recall that when Pancho
Villa crossed the Rio Grande and invaded American territory, killing American
citizens and destroying American property, the United States did not ask for
Villa's extradition but sent a punitive expedition into Mexico under General
Pershing to seize Villa and bring him back to the United States for trial.
With regard to trying Eichmann in Israel, it must be noted that if Eichmann had killed 6,000,000 Americans in 18 different countries and those
countries had refused or were unable to prosecute Eichmann, the United States
would not only have been justified, but it would have had the duty, which it
undoubtedly would have zestfully fulfilled, to attempt to capture Eichmann
and to take him to the United States for trial under the authority of article I,
section 8, subsection 10 of the Constitution of the United States.
At the time of the first Nuremberg trial, Senator Robert H. Taft declared
that the United States had stained its record by participating in a prosecution
for acts that were not crimes when committed. In other words, Senator Taft
charged the United States with ex post factoism. Dr. Servatius repeated this
argument in Jerusalem. Mr. Hausner reduced it to battered tinsel with the
simple statement that, basically, Eichmann was being tried for murder. And
was there ever a time that murder was not a crime?
The Israeli tribunal took jurisdiction of the Eichmann crime, and today
no respected authority in international law would question that the Israeli jurisdiction over Eichmann followed the norms of the recognized international code.
Indeed, West Germany, which had been one of Israel's bitterest critics, accepted
the Jerusalem trial of Eichmann as a precedent and itself initiated a number
of trials against SS officials who had killed Jews outside the territorial domains
of West Germany.
When all the questions of jurisdiction had been resolved, Gideon Hausner
advanced to the center of the legal arena with the flaming sword of justice
drawn from the scabbard of formal law. Here was a prosecution, the like of
which had never been experienced before. Was the prosecutor to treat the case
coldly and with words of metallic detachment? Not Gideon Hausner -and
the world thanks him for feeling deeply and speaking accordingly. A people
had been massacred; 6,000,000 human beings had been butchered for a Nazi
holiday. Was this not the occasion for thunderbolts, if ever there would be?
Hausner strode forth with the thunderbolts ready. He would soon show what
the trial of Adolf Eichmann was. It would be a modified Day of Judgment.
And so, the words erupted from his lips:
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"As I stand here before you, Judges of Israel, to lead the prosecution of
Adolf Eichmann, I do not stand alone. With me, in this place and at
this hour, stand six million accusers. But they cannot rise to their feet and
point an accusing finger toward the man who sits in the glass dock and
cry: 'I accuse.' For their ashes were piled up in the hills of Auschwitz and
in the fields of Treblinka, or washed away by the rivers of Poland; their
graves are scattered over the length and breadth of Europe. Their blood
cries out, but their voices are not heard. Therefore it falls to me to 2be their
spokesman and to unfold in their name the awesome indictment."
He spoke for three hours. The courtroom became a stage on which was
re-enacted, through the magic of his words, the unparalleled tragedy of the
martyred 6,000,000. For the first few minutes of Mr. Hausner's address, the
courtroom could have been a graveyard with headstones stretching out into
infinitude, so silent were the judges, the other lawyers, and the 700 onlookers
crowded into the space reserved for the audience. Then an occasional sob was
heard as the orator reproduced the pathetic scenes in the ghettos and the concentration camps; and then, as he proceeded to a description of the captive men,
women, and children being denuded and marched into the gas chambers, as
he told of the screaming infants being thrown into flaming ovens, and of the
other unspeakable atrocities of the Nazi inferno, the courtroom became a churning sea of piteous emotion. The next day, Mr. Hausner spoke for five more
hours and then on the third day he began to apply flesh and muscle to the
skeleton of the indictment. He presented evidence for 56 days. Much of that
soul-wrenching evidence is recited in the book.
What was Eichmann's defense? He said that he was acting under superior
orders, that he exercised no initiative, and that he was not much more than a
train dispatcher arranging schedules for the multitudes that were being shipped
to distant places. He knew that the transportees were going to be killed, but
that this was not his responsibility for he was only a lieutenant colonel. He obeyed
orders, he said.
Under questioning by Mr. Hausner, I testified to my conversations with
Goering, von Ribbentrop, Hans Frank, and others of the Nazi hierarchy, in
which they revealed that Adolf Eichmann was far from a mere cog in the Nazi
machine. He was the engineer; he supervised the murder mills, the gas wagons,
and the Einsatzgruppen firing squads. I testified also on the subject of superior
orders, stating that from my judicial experience in the Nuremberg trials it was
clear that the supposed inviolability of superior orders that were obviously
criminal was a myth because one could easily avoid any assignment of killing
civilians by merely asking to be sent to the military front. The SS killers, however, including Eichmarm, did not relish that kind of a transfer because at the
front, when they shot, the other side shot back. Eichmann preferred to remain
in his office swiveling in blood not his own.
If the Notre Dame Lawyer had not placed a limit on the length of my
review of Gideon Hausner's book, I fear I might go on for hundreds of pages
talking about this work that should be in every library, every schoolroom, and
indeed in every home, because no one can profess to be educated without know2
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ing of the most vast crime of the ages, how it came about, how its designer
planned and executed the unutterable offense and how at last he was brought
to justice.
In his closing speech to the Israeli tribunal, Mr. Hausner asked that the
ultimate penalty be imposed on the convicted defendant:
"By the enormity of -his crime Eichmann has excluded himself from
the society of human beings .. .he has shaken off moral restraints, and
has given gratification to the basest instincts, against which civilized man
has safeguarded himself by a wall of moral bans and injunctions.... Even
a murderer is still, in spite of the horror of his crime, within the pale of
human society. But he who sins against humanity undermines the very
existence of society. Such a creature has denied himself the right to walk
among human beings, and human society is enjoined to spew him out....
"We are not dealing here with something that is dead and buried; we are
not taking scrap metal out of the storehouse of history. Not one of the
survivors will ever be the same as he was before; nor will human society
again be able to be what it was, before these untouchables came and sent
millions to their deaths....
"I pray the court to award the wicked man facing it the penalty that a
human and civilized agency is capable of meting out. I know full well
that there is no possibility of giving him even a minute fraction of the
penalty appropriate to his deeds. Even if he were killed a thousand times,
even if he died anew each day, even then there would be no atonement
for the suffering -he caused to a single child .
Eichmann was hanged, his body cremated, and the ashes thrown to the
winds. This did not end the tragedy. It did not atone for the unpardonable
crime, but it helped to re-establish faith in a world of law.
What Martha Gelihorn, a well-known, American writer and humanist,
said of the Eichmann trial could be said of Gideon Hausner's book:
The trial was essential, to every human being now alive, and to all who
follow us... for the scene of the crime was a whole continent, the victims
were a whole nation, the methodical savages who committed the crimes
were as clever as they were evil, ingenious, brilliant organizers, addicts
to paperwork. This is"
the best record we and our descendants will ever
have; and we owe the state of Israel an immeasurable debt for providing
it. No one who tries to understand our times, now or in the future, can
overlook this documentation of a way of life and death which will stain
our century forever. No one will see the complete dimensions of twentiethcentury-men- and
that includes all of us, I insist - without studying the
4
Eichmann trial.
Michael A. Musmanno*

3 Id. at 429.
4 Gellhorn, Eichmann and the Private Conscience, Atlantic Monthly, Feb. 1962, p. 52

at 53.
*

Senior Associate Justice, Supreme Court of Pennsylvania; presided at Einsatzgruppen

trial, International War Crimes Tribunal, Nuremberg; member of Commission ofInternational

Judicial Procedure; Fellow of International Academy of Law and Science.

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

[April, 1967]

THE GOOD SAMARITAN AND THE LAW. Edited by James M. Ratcliffe. Garden

City: Anchor Books, Doubleday & Co. 1966. Pp. 300. $1.45.
Two thousand years ago a Jewish lawyer demanded a definition of the term
"neighbor." This makes him, I suppose, an analytical jurist. Whether the tale of
the Samaritan answered his perplexities we cannot say. But he would surely have
been astonished had he been informed that there were two answers to his question,
one if he was asking as a lawyer, another if he was asking as a layman. To him,
neighbor was neighbor and duty, duty. Perhaps this ancient lawyer's tale has a
moral for law and lawyers today.'
It should not astonish a lawyer, nor an Oxford don for that matter, that
"neighbor" and "duty" are relative and relational to circumstance and purpose.
Mrs. Palsgraf's loss demonstrated the latter, and the late Edmond Caln
succinctly put the former when he pointed out that
at any given time, we have to acknowledge at least three moral standards by which we pass judgment: they are (1) the standard we require,
(2) the standard we desire, and (3) the standard we revere. The first
we generally enforce by group punishment for infractions, and the second
we usually seek to bring about by preaching and praising the third. Since
we so often use the third - what might be called "saintly" or "heroic"
morality - for purposes of exhorting others and gratifying our own emotional mysticism, we may take it for granted that this standard does not
have much practical reference - that is,2 unless some genuine "saint" or
moral "hero" happens to come into view.
The central problem posed by The Good Samaritan and the Law is the
extent to which Calm's second standard - the standard we desire - has been,
and can be, reinforced by civil and criminal sanctions. Coerced compliance
with the third standard is advocated by only one of the book's contributors.
This contributor, Professor W. M. Rudolph, would seem to require housewives
to feed starving beggars, professional donors to give blood transfusions, Christian
Scientists to bring medical help, and licensed pilots to make emergency flights.
Failure to do so would render one civilly liable for the victim's harm or loss that
might have been averted by a rescue.' Presumably, Professor Rudolph would
require Lord Macaulay's fictional doctor to make that trip from Calcutta to
Meerut.4 The other contributors to this timely volume, and the laws and statutes
they cite, would impose a more limited duty to rescue than that proposed by
Professor Rudolph.
Some fifteen distinguished scholars are contributors to this collection of
essays, most of the papers having been delivered at a University of Chicago conference, dealing with the Good Samaritan problem, which was held shortly after
the Kitty Genovese murder. In addition to the papers presented at the conference, the book includes Dean Ames' classic article on "Law and Morals,"
1 HonorS, Law, Morals and Rescue, in THE GOOD SAMARITAN AND THE LAW 242
(Ratcliffe ed. 1966).
2 CAHN, THE MORAL DECISION 40-41 (1955).
3 Rudolph, The Duty to Act: A Proposed Rule, in THE GOOD SAMARITAN AND THE LAW
243 '(Ratcliffe ed. 1966).
4 IV MACAULAY, THE MISCELLANEOUS WoRxs 252 (Whitehall ed.).
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which introduces the reader to the extremely individualistic common law context
of the problem,' and Professor Charles 0. Gregory's delineation of the more
recent developments in the law of torts.6 Of special value to the comparativist
are the articles contributed by Professors Tunc7 and Rudzinski, who summarize
those European statutes and decisions that impose a duty to intervene in order
to save others from imminent peril. Hans Zeisel contributes a public opinion
poll of dubious value and concludes that it makes no difference in personal
behavior whether or not a Good Samaritan law exists.' Of academic interest is
the attempt of two senior law students from the University of Chicago to draft
a model Good Samaritan Act."
Except for Professor Rudolph, most of the contributors seem to accept
Jeremy Bentham's rule, reitereated by Dean Ames, that there should be a duty
to intervene in order to save another from impending death or serious bodily
injury, when such may be done with little or no inconvenience. There is, however, disagreement as to the efficacy of legal sanctions as determinants of human
behavior. Arthur L. Goodhart is quoted as saying that "the only people who
will offer their services to others in distress do not have to be required to do so;
and those who will not do it voluntarily pay no attention to official sanctions."''
Professor Tunc, speaking from the experience of an observer of French law in
action, takes the contrary position. He feels that the law can help awaken public
opinion as to the requirements of justice and even as to the requirements of
ethics, and concludes that the French law "acts as an incentive to everybody to
behave like the Good Samaritan."' 2
The arguments over whether or not law ways can change folkways, and
whether or not an unenforced or unenforceable law has reprobative value that
is sufficient justification for the law's existence, have not been resolved by the
several authors. In fact, those perennial arguments never have been satisfactorily
concluded and continue to arise in various contexts, the position taken depending
largely upon the spokesman's moral commitments regarding the particular issue.
The real and ideal are frequently at odds, at least in the eyes of the beholder.
Those who hold fervent moral convictions regarding adultery, homosexuality,
abortion, obscenity, alcoholism, drug addiction, gambling, prostitution, and perhaps Good Samaritanship may not be perturbed by the law's inefficacy or
desuetude. They may point to a relatively efficacious implementation into law
of such moral obligations as those regarding usury, exploitative contracts, child
labor, sweatshops, workmen's compensation, and fair employment regulations.
To the realist, however, the moral activist must produce empirical evidence as
Ames, Law and Morals, in THE GOOD SAMARITAN AND THE LAW 1 (Ratcliffe ed. 1966).
6 Gregory, The Good Samaritan and the Bad: The Anglo-American Law, in id. at 23.
7 Xune, The Volunteer and the Good Samaritan,in id. at 43.
8 Rudzinski, The Duty to Rescue: A Comparative Analysis, in id. at 91.
9 Zeisel, An International Experiment on the Effects of a Good Samaritan Law, in id.
at 209.
10 Miller & Zimmerman, The Good Samaritan Act of 1966: A Proposal, in id. at 279.
The students' draft is of special interest because in addition to the central problem of
whether or not (and under what circumstances) there is a duty to act, the proposal also deals
with problems as to the compensation of the injured Good Samaritan, intervention to prevent
the commission of crimes, and injuries to third persons.
11 Gregory, op. cit. supra note 6, at 31.
12 Tunc, op. cit. supra note 7, at 62.
5
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to why sin should be made criminal or tortious, for the realist's premise is that
in a democratic society the sanction of legal control ought not to be used unless
there is a clear consensus to support its enforcement. Recently, Professor
H. L. A. Hart' and Lord Devlin' 4 have had a great deal to say on this argument
and at the moment the Hart felt premises are gaining acceptance.'
The essay by Dr. Freedman, a psychiatrist, may afford some comfort in
dealing with the vexing Good Samaritan problem. In discussing the causes for
unresponsiveness to cries for help, he singles out, as primary factors, fear, anxiety,
lack of perception, and finally the absence of personal involvement, and says
that apathy and indifference are the least likely primary psychic vectors in response to the Good Samaritan situation." Joseph Gusfield, a sociologist, is reassuring when he says that "indifference is the other side of privacy," 7 but
is disturbing when he points out that the concentration of ethnic groups in our
cities breeds mistrust and fear of violence from other groups. Finally, a philosophic justification for the status quo of the common law is offered by Professor Fingarette who says:
the other side of the coin: whether my soul is saved or not is none of
the state's business. Let Caesar regulate his own affairs: keeping the public
order and the public well-being. My soul is my affair. This was Jesuse
teaching; it is also central to our own political tradition. 8
The essays and material presented in The Good Samaritan and the Law
are of jurisprudential and practical significance. This could be a valuable and
workable book for a course in Introduction to Law, Legislation, or Jurisprudence.
For nonlawyers, including students of philosophy, sociology, and political science,
there is a wealth of material that has relevancy to the problems of law as a means
of social control and the choice that may be made between alternative sanctions.
But for the average reader there remains unanswered the questions posed by
Professor Honor6:
Should the law, with its mechanisms of inducement, reWards, and compensation, be used to encourage what the shared morality treats as laudable
and discouraged what it reprobates? Should the law ... go further and,
by the use of threats and penalties, "enforce" morality?' 9
Answers to these questions must be postponed until we respond to the basic
question. Most of us have never resolved the problem of am I (and to what
extent) my brother's keeper? When the bell tolls, some of us turn deaf ears,
others respond, and still others merely contemplate the passage of time.
13
14

HART, LAw, LIBERTY AND MORALITY (1963), 55 J. CRIm. L., C. & P.S. 393 (1964).
DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS (1959).

15 Although the Wolfenden Report did not gain immediate acceptance, it appears to
have prevailed, and Parliament presently is considering legislation to remove criminal sanctions
against homosexual behavior between consenting adults in private. The recent report of the
Law Commission also indicates that nonfault grounds probably will be added to the Matrimonial Causes law.
16 Freedman, No Response to the Cry for Help, THE GOOD SAMARITAN AND THE LAW
171 (Ratcliffe ed. 1966).
17 Gusfield, Social Sources of Levites and Samaritans, in id. at 183, 191.
18 Fingarette, Some Moral Aspects of Good Samaritanship, in id. at 213, 218.
19 Honor6, op cit. supra note 1, at 242.
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It is my belief that although Good Samaritanship is to be encouraged,
since the law to be functional must embody only a minimum ethic, only
egregious examples of wanton indifference should be subject to the law's clumsy
sanctions.
Henry H. Foster,Jr.*
SEARCH & SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT-

A STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL

By Jacob W. Landynski.*
Hopkins Press. 1966. Pp. 286, x. $8.50.
INTERPRETATION.

Baltimore:

The Johns

This book is the first in the 84th series (1966) of "The Johns Hopkins
University Studies in Historical and Political Science" which is under the direction of the Departments of History, Political Economy, and Political Science. The
author is an Associate Professor of Political Science in the Graduate Faculty of
the New School for Social Research in New York City.
The author has done a remarkable job in limiting the length of his text to
270 pages, because as he states:
Unlike some other areas of constitutional law, where precedents may
acquire sanctity from old age, if from little else, many search and seizure
problems are of fairly recent origin and not precedent-bound. Such precedents as do exist are frequently ambiguous and tend to age quickly.
Opinions are befogged by a rhetoric that obscures basic judicial assumptions,
and the justices responsible for the decisions may later disagree on what
they meant in earlier decisions and may give differing reasons for their
arrival at the same result. The result is that, taken collectively, the cases
discussed . . . resemble a battle of constitutional conflict rather than a
chapter of constitutional law.'
The subtitle of the book is "A Study in Constitutional Interpretation."
This history of the decisions of the United States Supreme Court on the fourth
amendment suggests, at least inferentially, that the word "interpretation" should
probably be replaced by the word "creation." For example, in Professor
Landynski's discussion of the exclusionary rule (the rule that authorizes the
defendant to require the suppression of evidence seized during an illegal search),
the following appears:
One thing is certain: the exclusionary rule is the most creative single
act"of the Supreme Court in this area of constitutional law. The Court's
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment revolves around the exclusionary
rule.... Without the exclusionary rule, the illegality of the search would
be immaterial to the admission of the evidence, and the judicial development2
of the Fourth Amendment as we know it would have proved impossible.
Professor of Law and Director of the Law-Psychiatry Project, New York University;
member of American Law Institute; chairman of the Research Committee, and member of
Council of the Family Law Section, American Bar Association; co-author of SOCIETY AND
THE LAw
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1 LANDYNsxr, SEARCH & SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT 143 (1966) [hereinafter
cited as LANDYNsxr].
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To me this statement represents in effect an admission that most of the
clamor and demand for enforcement of the fourth amendment has come from
criminals. Nothing in the book indicates that very many innocent parties have
had their fourth amendment rights infringed; or if they have, that they have
been sufficiently inconvenienced or concerned to seek protection or vindication
of those rights either from the courts, the state legislatures, or the Congress.
In considering the origin and significance of the fourth amendment, it is
said in the first chapter:
[T]he Fourth Amendment provides us with a rich historical background
rooted in American, as well as English, experience; it is the one procedural
safeguard in the Constitution that grew directly out of the events which
immediately preceded the revolutionary struggle with England.3
The author points out that the historical reason for the adoption of the fourth
amendment was to prevent the exercise of the broad search and seizure powers
that had been used by the English both to suppress freedom of the press4 and
to enforce unpopular tax and revenue laws.5
The second chapter deals effectively with the 1886 case of Boyd v. United
States,' the first major case in which the United States Supreme Court endeavored to interpret the fourth amendment. It is stated that the court's
majority opinion assigns "the wrong reason for the right decision -in
holding
the forced production of the papers to be an unreasonable search rather than
an incrimination [within the meaning of the fifth amendment], and then requiring exclusion of the evidence,"' and that, in doing so, "the Court was, in
effect, discarding the common-law rule of the admissibility and requiring exclusion of the fruits of illegal searches from all criminal trials."8 The author also
comments: "Some of the criticism has resulted from the fact that the Boyd
decision served to protect proven smugglers . ..though, ironically, it was ...
the unrestrained search for smuggled goods that brought the Fourth Amendment
into being."9
The third chapter deals with the "Federal Exclusionary Rule," which
originated with the 1914 case of Weeks v. United States," a case involving the
illegal use of the mails to transmit lottery tickets. It is interesting to note
that the subsequent cases (at least until 1964) that are described as
applying the exclusionary rule in order to enforce the fourth amendment
provisions relate to such matters as violations of the prohibition laws,"
gambling, 2 possession of obscene literature," possession of wiretapping
3 Id. at 19.
4 Id. at 20-21.
5 Id. at 25.
6 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
7 LANDYNSKi 60.
8 Ibid.
9 Id. at 57.
10 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
11 Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310 (1927); Byars v. United States, 273 U.S.
28 (1927).
12 Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954).
13 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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apparatus, 4 narcotics law violations, 5 conspiracy to defraud the Government, 6
and counterfeiting." In my opinion, if application of the exclusionary rule had
been confined to cases involving such nonviolent crimes, and not extended to cases
involving robbery, burglary, murder, rape, and other crimes of violence that
pose a greater threat to public security, there would have been little incentive
for opposing the rule." However, the Supreme Court did not indicate any
intention to so confine the rule, and recent decisions have not so confined it."5
The chapter on "Constitutional Searches Without Warrant" emphasizes
how far the Supreme Court has gone in recognizing the validity and expanding
the scope of searches incident to lawful arrests.2" As the author points out,
however, there has not yet been a significant amount of guidance as to what
constitutes an arrest and when it is lawful."'
A substantial portion of the book details the steps taken by the court
from 1949, when it held that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment made the search and seizure provisions of the fourth amendment applicable
to the states, 22 until 1961, when its decision in Mapp2s imposed the exclusionary
rule upon the states. As to the Supreme Court's long delay, from 1961 until
1965, in answering the question whether the Mapp decision should be given
retroactive effect, Professor Landynski astutely observes:
The long delay may have been strategic; it can perhaps be explained
by a desire on the part of the Court not to foreclose a retroactive interpretation by such state courts as might choose to follow this
24 course, coupled
with its own intention not to require a retroactive ruling.
There is an interesting chapter describing the decisions of the Supreme Court
on the currently controversial topic of "Eavesdropping and the Constitution."
This chapter clearly indicates the author's belief that in this area the Supreme
Court has not gone far enough in applying the exclusionary rule.
'Also included is a provocative chapter on "Administrative Invasion of
Privacy." This chapter discusses Frank v. Maryland25 and Ohio ex rel. Eaton
v. Price26 and concludes with the following observation:
As matters now stand, the criminal whose home has been searched
without a warrant may have the evidence excluded. The law-abiding
householder faces a prison sentence or fine when he refuses to permit his
14 Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
15 Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960);
Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214- (1956); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952);
United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951).
16 Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
17 Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74 (1949).
18 LANDYNsxi 191 n.89.
19 Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964); Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364

(1964).
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22 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
23 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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25 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
26 364 U.S. 263 (1960).
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privacy to be invaded. It seems contradictory to construe the Fourth
Amendment in such a manner as to make it a protection for the criminal
suspect who misuses his privacy to shield the evidence of his guilt, and not
for the honest citizen who values privacy for its own sake.27
For those, like myself, who disagree with the imposition of the exclusionary
rule on the states, this represents an argument against such imposition. On the
other hand, for those who favor the exclusionary rule and its imposition on
the states, as the author of this book apparently does, this is an argument against
the decisions of the Supreme Court in Frank v. Maryland and Ohio ex rel. Eaton
v. Price.
Both those who argue in favor of, and those who argue against, the exclusionary rule as a means of protecting fourth amendment rights frequently base
their arguments on emotional appeals. The author is no exception. Thus he
states:
The law officer . ..embodies in his person the community's dedication
to law and order. When he sins, the law loses its moral grandeur ...
When the community itself, through the agency of its law officers, disregards
the law, the moral superstructure is undermined.2"
The author fails to recognize that application of the exclusionary rule will
frequently undermine public confidence in the law. I believe that the general
public shares Dean Wigmore's view29 that it is difficult, if not impossible, to
grasp any rational basis for the exclusionary rule. It can be a contempt of court"
and a criminal offense31 for an individual intentionally to suppress or prevent
use of evidence of a defendant's crime. Yet, the exclusionary rule requires a
court to suppress reliable evidence of a defendant's guilt. How can the public
not fail to lose confidence in such an administration of justice?
I was especially interested in determining whether this book would indicate any historical basis for using the exclusionary rule to protect fourth amendment rights. The book makes it absolutely clear that there is none.
The book did not satisfy my curiosity as to how far the so-called "fruit of
the poisonous tree" doctrine has been or will be carried. It assumes that "not
only the illegally seized evidence itself . . .is inadmissible" but that "equally
inadmissible is other evidence obtained through leads provided by the illegal
search."3 2 What decisions there have been apparently do not provide much
valuable guidance as to how far this doctrine will be carried.3
Presumably because the decisions of the Supreme Court have not yet given
any notable amount of guidance, the book fails to cast much light upon the
troublesome question of when a warrant may be ineffective to justify a search. 4
Another reason for my interest in reading this book was to determine
27
28
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whether any other civilized jurisdiction has a rule excluding or suppressing evidence obtained in an illegal search. Some information on this appears in one
of the book's footnotes s where reference is made to a pertinent periodical article, 6
and the author states that "of the various jurisdictions surveyed, only France
appears to have a general rule for the exclusion of illegally seized evidence,
though some countries compromise by excluding when the violation is of a
grave character, as, for instance, when brutality is involved," [e.g., coerced
confessions are excluded]. A reading of the reference does not indicate the origin
of the French rule. I believe that other nations' general nonrecognition of the
rule excluding illegally seized evidence should raise a serious question as to
whether there is any rational basis for the rule.
The only rational, as well as primary, basis suggested is that criminal sanctions and civil liability had failed to deter officers from illegal searches and
that, therefore, imposition of the exclusionary rule was the only effective means
There is, as the author recognizes,
of protecting fourth amendment rights
"no conclusive evidence . . . available ' " to support the factual premise for
such a conclusion. His outline of what evidence there is" is not especially convincing, particularly in the light of recent reports on law enforcement in the
District of Columbia.
In recognizing that "other approaches have been suggested as alternatives
to exclusion of the seized evidence,"4 it is stated:
Professor Foote has advocated statutes which provide for minimum
liquidated damages without regard to the character of the plaintiff.41 A
California state bar committee recommended that the officer's employer
- whether the state, county, or a city - be held liable for damages. This
proposal, said Dean Barrett, "gives promise of providing a more adequate
solution than the exclusionary rule at a smaller social cost"'42 especially
the remedy would be available to the
since, unlike the exclusionary rule,
43
innocent as well as the guilty.
The author has apparently tried to be impartial in evaluating the Supreme
Court's creation of the exclusionary rule and its application of the rule, including
its imposition upon the states. However, one is left with the general impression
that the author is in agreement with this use of the exclusionary rule.44
35
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to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." The significance of this
argument becomes clear when one considers that the fourteenth amendment is the only basis
ever suggested for applying the fourth amendment to the states.
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The author, then, has reported very well what the Supreme Court has
done in requiring application of the exclusionary rule and its reasons for doing
so; but he has not questioned whether the Court should have acted as it has
and thus whether the law should be as it is now following the Elkins, 5 Mapp,48
Stoner" and Preston" decisions. Perhaps he has not raised such a question
because he recognizes, as all of us probably should, the futility of doing so.
Kingsley A. Taft*
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AN INDICTMENT OF THE AUTO INDUSTRY. By Jeffrey O'Connell and Arthur Myers. New York: Random House. 1966. Pp. vi,
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SAFETY LAST -

As indicated by the authors of Safety Last, 47,700 Americans lost their lives
in automobile accidents in 1964.' This was a 9% rise over 1963. In the preface
to Unsafe at Any Speed it was predicted that the figure of 51,000 would be
reached in 1965.2 As reported by the National Safety Council, the 1965 figure
was in fact 49,000, which was 3% over 1964. The National Safety Council also
reported an estimated 1,800,000 disabling injuries in 1965. For the first eleven
months of 1966, the Safety Council shows 47,680 traffic accident deaths an increase of 8% for the same period in 1965. As further evidence of the
magnitude of the problem, it is asserted in Safety Last that "according to a
responsible estimate, one now has a fifty-fifty chance of being hurt or killed in
a traffic crash during a lifetime."3 The economic losses, including such items as
property damage, medical and hospital expenses, lost wages, and insurance overhead costs were estimated in 1964 as 8.3 billion dollars, and if to this are added
the indirect costs, Nader suggests the total cost to be about 2% of the gross
national product.4
This situation poses two major social problems for our free society. The
first is accident prevention, and the second is the development of a sound national
system for allocating losses from accidents that do occur. Nader points out quite
correctly that most of the talents and energies of experts of various kinds, including lawyers, engineers, and public officials, have been devoted to the second
problem, i.e., that of allocating losses after accidents occur rather than preventing accidents and injuries from accidents.
45
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Many acts and conditions can constitute factual causes for accidents. It
is never accurate to say that a particular act of one of the drivers, or the design
of some part of a vehicle, or some condition of the highway was the sole factual
cause for an accident or an injury from an accident. But, in identifying various
causes for accidents, and in seeking solutions to the problems of allocating losses
and preventing traffic accidents on the highway, one's attention is naturally
directed to (1) the driver, (2) the vehicle, and (3) the highway.
Both personal injury suits and governmental regulation have tended to
concentrate on the driver as the legally responsible cause for traffic accidents,
and the thesis of both the Nader and the O'Connell-Myers books is that the
unsafe practices in the design of automobiles have been too much ignored. The
ignoring of the unsafe design practices has resulted in large part because of an
unholy alliance between the automobile industry and the various agencies,
public and private, that can be said to constitute the safety establishment. In
support of this charge the authors state that: (1) accident investigation is oriented
toward the detection of malfeasance of the driver5 even though often this socalled malfeasance or fault may merely consist of such factors as honest errors
of judgment, inadvertence, and a natural human weakness to take chances, which
factors, it can be argued, should have been taken into account and guarded against
in the design of the vehicle; (2) the National Safety Council attributes 90%
of the traffic accidents that occur to improper driving6 when no doubt other
concurrent causes could be listed as being legally responsible. Because there are
often multiple causes for a particular accident, the National Safety Council's
figure is misleading. Realistically, it could as easily be said that about the same
percentage of accidents and injuries from accidents was attributable to either
the condition of the highway or vehicular design. It is important that the causes
be accurately identified if a correct decision is to be made as to what steps are
to be taken in preventing accidents and allocating losses.
Whereas accident prevention sometimes influences the development of
legal doctrines for shifting losses arising out of accidents, other factors often
have more compelling influence. The primary issue in a personal injury suit
is that of deciding who ought to bear the loss now that it has occurred, rather
than what measures society should take to prevent such occurrences. Without
doubt, more and more attention is being given to alternatives to the exis tig
plans for the allocation of losses from traffic accidents, and various plans for
compensating victims of traffic accidents are being proposed and discussed,
including a plan in part devised by Jeffrey O'Connell, one of the authors of
Safety Last.' It is not inappropriate to consider the maker of the automobile
as an entity for the assumption of some of the losses, especially in view of his
risk-distributing capacity to all of the purchasers of his automobiles. Substantially prior to the publication of both of these books, judge-made law had been
altered in somewhat revolutionary ways in order to allocate to the makers of
products more of the losses of those who are victimized by the use of the products.
No doubt the efforts of the authors of these two books have already given
5 Id. at 238.
6

7

Id. at 239.
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impetus to this development, and the effect will continue for some time. We can
expect the legislative and judicial branches to give increasing attention to the
vehicle as a responsible cause for traffic injuries and fatalities, and hopefully,
accident investigators will be better trained and directed in identifying not only
driver misconduct, but also vehicular causes for injuries.
The spotlight of publicity on the automobile's unsafe design features has
resulted in the passage of safety legislation by Congress. Because of the nature
of the problem, it is to governmental regulation, and particularly to federal
regulation, that we must turn if any significant impact is to be made on the
incidence of injuries from accidents generally, and from traffic accidents in
particular. We have already experienced a good deal of governmental safety
regulation -typified, for example, by the efforts of the Federal Food and Drug
Administration to reduce the incidence of harm to those who are victimized
by new drugs, both good and bad.
Both of these books are written as an indictment of a particular industry,
and for several reasons I believe this can lead the reader to acquire a warped
view of the problem. In the first place, unsafe practices are not unique to the
automobile industry but are quite common to all industries because of the pressures of competition and because consumers, i.e., all of us, are more interested
in a product's price, looks, and other considerations than we are in its safety
features. The conduct of consumers in the use of cigarettes is an example. I
do not believe that as a group those who are a part of the automobile industry
are any different from the rest of us. This is not to say that their customs should
not be evaluated and found wanting. But the principle "judge not, lest ye be
judged" is worth remembering. Perhaps only in the way that the problem is
depicted in these books can the public and the regulatory authorities be aroused.
And so I believe that the authors have performed a significant public service in
the exposures made, but in so doing I also feel that they have exaggerated the
"misconduct" of the makers of automobiles; rather, they should have indicted
us all. It is not absence of competition that has produced the unsafe car; it
is rather a lack of a proper sense of values on the part of us all. As Nader states,
the automobile is the major industrial art form in our society, and it is designed
to appeal to the consumer's esthetic desires and not to his interest in safety.'
This reasonably follows from the fact that the "reasonable or ordinary man" is
more interested in the car's esthetic features than in its safety features. The
maker's conduct is not, therefore, necessarily unreasonable or negligent. It does
not follow that Congress should be unconcerned.
I quite agree with O'Connell and Myers that we cannot "dismiss comprehensive regulation in favor of personal injury suits as a means of encouraging
design reform."' I also agree with their observation in the excellent chapter on
the driver that the National Safety Council's "horrendous holiday death-toll"
predictions are somewhat of a farce and indeed repulsive. The authors say that
"to imagine that coercing or exhorting them to . . . [drive carefully] is the key
to the traffic safety problem 'seems a little bit like trying to stop a typhoid epi8
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demic by urging each family to boil its own drinking water and not eat oysters.""'
Both books devote considerable attention to design features that do not
cause accidents but rather increase the possibility of incurring injuries and increasing the incidence of death when an accident does occur. This is the topic
Nader deals with in the chapter on "The Second Collision: When man meets
car."" Thus attention is drawn to the instrument panel, seat belts and other
passenger restraints, the steering mechanism, convertibles, the X-frame, and
the like, for the purpose of showing that accidents, attributable in part to other
causes such as driver negligence, are often much more serious than they otherwise would have been, because of a design calculated to appeal to esthetic considerations rather than safety. Improper designs of this nature will inevitably
result in a considerable amount of tort litigation, and the law at present is
unsettled. In a fairly recent case it was held that a maker is not subject to
any liability for an alleged design defect, even when negligence is established,
unless the defect is a cause of the accident.' This I submit is unsound even
though such a case often presents a difficult problem of ascertaining the amount
of the injuries attributable to the defective design.
Both books are well worth thoughtful reading, and one or the other of
these books should be read by everyone involved in these matters, but the conclusions and information contained in the books are so nearly alike that it is
unnecessary to read both.
Page Keeton*
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